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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j), as
amended.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented to this Court for review:
ISSUE NO. 1:

Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Neely's

motion for directed verdict?
Standard of appellate review: The denial of a motion for directed verdict may be
overturned only if no evidence existed that raised a question of material fact. Alta Health
Strategies, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical Service, 930 P.2d 280, 284 (Utah App. 1996).
Preservation in record below: This issue was raised by Neely's motion for directed
verdict. (R. 302 at 637-43).
ISSUE NO. 2:

Did the district court err in denying Neely's motion for additur or

for new trial?
Standard of appellate review:

The denial of a motion for new trial will be

overturned only if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d
789, 799 (Utah 1991).
Preservation in record below:

This issue was briefed by the parties below in

connection with Neely's Motion for Additur or for New Trial. (R. 240-68).
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
There are no Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
This action arose out of a 5-mile-per-hour automobile accident that occurred on
May 16, 1996, involving appellant Ranae Neely and appellee Steven Bennett. Neely filed
a complaint on April 28, 1997. (R. 1) The case was tried to an 8-person jury from
February 28 through March 2, 2000. (R. 80).
At the conclusion of testimony, Neely moved for a directed verdict on negligence
and causation as to special damages. (R. 302 at 637-43). The trial court denied Neely's
motion. (R. 302 at 643). By special verdict, the jury awarded Neely $2,902.00 in Past
Special Damages (medical bills, out-of-pocket expenses, past lost income) and $1,000.00
in General Damages. The jury did not award anything for Future Special Damages. (R.
135-36). The unanimous verdict was confirmed through polling. (R. 302 at 678-82).
Pursuant to Utah law, the trial court deducted from the award of Past Special
Damages the amount of no-fault benefits previously paid to Neely by her own insurance
carrier, which exceeded $2,902.00, reducing the award for those damages to $0. Because
Neely had not exceeded the no-fault threshold of $3,000.00 in medical expenses and
therefore was not entitled to claim general damages, the court also reduced the General
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Damages award to $0. Judgment on the verdict was entered accordingly on March 24,
2000. (R. 232).
Neely filed a Motion for Additur or New Trial on April 4, 2000. (R. 240). After
briefing and oral argument, the trial court denied Neely's motion by Order dated
September 11, 2000. (R. 274). Neely filed a timely notice of appeal on September 25,
2000. (R. 277).
Statement of Facts
On May 16, 1996, plaintiff Neely was behind the wheel of a 1993 Ford Ranger
pickup truck that was stopped at a red light at the intersection of 9000 South and 450
West in Sandy, Utah. (R. 301 at 438, lines 3-7). About four or five feet behind her, a
1984 Ford Escort compact car driven by defendant Steven Bennett was also waiting for
the light to change. (R. 301 at 530, lines 2-4). The pickup had a camper shell on it
covering the bed, and weighed about 900 pounds more than the Escort. (R. 301 at 480,
lines 3-7, at 586, lines 20-21).
Bennett and Neely had been at a full stop for up to a minute when Bennett reached
into the back seat to give his two-year-old son a drink. (R. 301 at 529-30, lines 19-24). In
doing so, Bennett's foot slipped off the clutch and the car lurched forward, striking the
bumper of Neely's pickup. (R. 301 at 530, lines 5-2). At trial, Bennett acknowledged
that the accident was his fault. (R. 301 at 537, lines 20-22).
Both the defendant's and the plaintiffs accident reconstructionists, as well as the
Sandy City police officer who investigated the accident, all estimated the speed of
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Bennett's car to about five miles per hour. (R. 301 at 569, lines 7-9, at 583-86, lines 1-14,
at 630-31, lines 20-2 ("five, maybe six, seven miles per hour"); R. 299 at 168, lines 1422, at 175-76, lines 24-14 (five miles an hour, give or take half mile an hour)). Taking
into account the impact speed, the weight of the vehicles, and other factors, Bennett's
expert concluded that Neely experienced a force of approximately 4.8 miles per hour from
the collision. (R. 301 at 590, lines 1-21).
The force of the impact was sufficiently low that Bennett was not thrown forward
in his car, and neither he nor any of the children in the Escort experienced any pain or
injury. (R. 301 at 533, lines 8-25, at 531, lines 3-11). None of the children cried or had
any emotional reaction to the impact. (R. 301 at 531, lines 15-21).
Bennett and Neely got out of their vehicles, and Bennett apologized. Neely told
Bennett that the truck had just gotten out of the shop, and her husband was going to kill
her. (R. 301 at 532, lines 3-4, 18-24).
The only damage suffered by Bennett's car was a "skiff (small dent) on the right
side of the front bumper. The repair estimate for the damage was $50. (R. 301 at 534,
lines 3-17, at 574, lines 16-17). The repair estimate for damage to Neely's pickup was
about $150. (R. 301 at 574, lines 8-15). The jury was shown blown-up photographs that
accurately depicted the minor damage to the two vehicles. (R. 299 at 174-75, lines 1823).
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Both vehicles were fully drivable after the accident. From the scene, Neely's
husband drove Neely in the pickup to a hospital emergency room, where she was
examined and released. (R. 301 at 509, lines 5-24).
On May 17, Neely told her supervisor at work, Nancy Powell, that she had been in
a "minor accident" the day before. (R. 301 at 547, lines 8-15). At trial, Neely claimed
that she also told Powell that she "was in a lot of pain," and that she asked to be excused
from work "because I needed to go see my doctor because I was hurting quite badly." (R.
301 at 471-72, lines 20-5). According to Powell, however, Neely mentioned only that the
truck had just been fixed. Powell asked Neely if she was all right, and Neely said, "yeah,
she was okay, she was just upset." (R. 301 at 547, lines 11-23). Powell testified that she
told Neely to go home because Neely was upset about the accident. (R. 301 at 547-48,
lines 24-3).
A few days after the accident, Neely visited the workplace wearing a neck brace,
and told Powell that her neck hurt. About a week later, Neely came in and told the
supervisor that "there was something wrong with her brain and they thought that they
were going to have to do surgery on her brain." A week or so later, Neely came in again,
now reporting that there was something wrong with her jaw. (R. 301 at 548-50, lines 48).
Powell happened to live one street over from Neely at the time, and about two
weeks after the accident, she observed Neely as she was driving past Neely's home.
Powell noticed that Neely did not have her neck brace on. (R. 301 at 557-58, lines 4-20).
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Three or four weeks later, Neely came in to the workplace again, and this time was
stuttering in what Powell characterized as a "very obvious" manner. The supervisor
testified that she had been around people who had grown up being stutterers, and that
Neely's was "a different type of stuttering."

The stutterers with whom Powell had

associated would normally pause in between to get a sentence right, but Neely stuttered
on every word. "[Everything was stuttering. Everything." (R. 301 at 550-51, lines 127).
Neely never returned to work, and was terminated on June 21, 1996,
approximately five weeks after the accident. During the interim, Neely had continued to
be paid by her employer, Freedom Mortgage. (R. 301 at 552, lines 9-19). Freedom sent
Neely an application for Family Medical Leave, but Neely did not respond, and did not
produce the documentation requested. (R. 301 at 553, lines 3-11). In July of 1996,
Freedom suffered a downturn from a jump in interest rates, and had a massive layoff.
The entire department in which Neely had worked was eliminated. (R. 301 at 554-55,
lines 12-2).
About a month after the accident, Neely reported that she had passed out, and was
taken to an emergency room. At trial, Neely claimed that this incident was caused by her
accident in May.
diagnosis:

The emergency room physician, however, rendered a different

Hyperventilation, likely brought about by the fact that Neely, who was

agoraphobic, had ventured outside to the movies with a family member that evening. The
E.R. physician's diagnosis followed a CT scan, electrocardiogram, and Chem 7 and
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CBC's, all of which came back normal. (R. 299 at 127-29, lines 25-20). In July of 1996,
Neely declined a psychiatric referral from her neurologist, Dr. Walter Reichert. (R. 299 at
134, lines 1-16).
Neely claimed that she was unable to work for nearly two and a half years as a
result of the May 16, 1996, accident. (R. 301 at 463, lines 13-15).
After the accident, Neely stored the pickup in her garage and did not move it, drive
it, or repair it. (R. 301 at 465, lines 1-7). Neely acknowledged at trial that she wanted to
keep the pickup as evidence for her claim. (R. 301 at 492-93, lines 23-2, at 494-95, lines
19-6).1
Neely attributed a multitude of symptoms to this low-speed accident, including
head pain, headaches, jaw pain, tinnitis (ringing of the right ear), vision problems, neck
pain, back pain, shoulder pain, stuttering, forgetfulness, lightheadedness, anxiety,
dizziness and depression. (R. 300 at 221-22, lines 16-9; R. 299 at 122-23, lines 17-8).
While treating with her various health care professionals,

Neely reported a

constant level of excruciating pain — estimated at 9 and 10 on a scale of 1 to 10 — even
though she was taking three different prescription pain medications and an anti-

Although she denied it at trial, the jury could have concluded that Neely also took other unusual
steps to provide evidence for her claim. For instance, at one point during Neely's course of
treatment, an epidural was placed in her back, of which Neely had a photograph taken. At trial,
Neely claimed that her only motivation for having the photograph taken was that she was "kind
of interested in seeing what it looked like," and couldn't look in a mirror to see. When asked if
she had considered using the tried and true method of holding up a mirror and looking in a mirror
behind her (a common method of checking the back of one's hair), Neely said she had never
done that. (R. 301 at 490, lines 4-19).
7

inflammatory. (R. 300 at 247-48, lines 11-21, at 359-60, lines 19-24, at 336, lines 16-17).
Neely also claimed to be having frequent nightmares. (R. 300 at 248, lines 22-23).
Evidence presented at trial suggested that many of Neely's claimed injuries preexisted the accident, were exaggerated, or were just plain fake. In the weeks before the
accident, Neely was "upset a lot of the time" and crying, according to Powell. Neely told
Powell, again prior to the accident, that "she had had a lot of health problems.... [I]t was
always an issue of one thing or another as far as her health was concerned." (R. 301 at
556-57, lines 14-1). About a week before the accident, the supervisor received a report
that Neely had had an emotional breakdown at work, witnessed by three processors,
Kathy Ridges, Kathy Margetts, and Terri Reedy. As described by the supervisor:
She — she was in a very, very distraught state of mind. She had been for a
few weeks. And she was — she was crying, she was talking about family. She was
— she was so bad, and we — "we" meaning myself and her previous supervisor,
took her into an office and tried to calm her down. And she — she was going on
and on and crying, out of control. And then she went upstairs and laid by one of
the processors' desks in the middle of the floor and was kicking and crying.
And the reason I remember the incident so well is the president of the
company walked over the top of her when she was doing this. We were so
concerned about her mental well-being that her previous supervisor made an
appointment for her to go in to counseling.
She had talked about suicide. And so she made an appointment for her to
go in to counseling the next day, which she did not keep.
(R. 301 at 555-56, lines 7-13; see also R. 301 at 559-61, lines 19-5).
Neely had been in a similar low-speed rear-end accident on October 22, 1992.
With respect to that earlier accident, Neely reported that she had been looking straight
forward, and that her head was thrown backward, hitting the back of the seat. (R. 299 at
116, lines 12-17). Neely reported headaches and memory problems from the 1992
8

accident that were "quite similar" to those claimed after the 1996 accident.

(R. 299 at

115, lines 12-20, at 134-35, lines 17-5; R. 300 at 379-80, lines 18-1, at 407, lines 1-4; R.
300 at 370-71, lines 18-6). Neely claimed on both occasions to have lost her job because
of the accident. (R. 300 at 407, lines 16-19).
Neely was represented by the same law firm for both accidents, and used several of
the same health care providers, including her chiropractor, Brad Peterson, neurologist, Dr.
Walter Reichert, and massage therapist, Katherine Jepsen. (R. 300 at 379-80, lines 9-23;
R. 301 at 503, lines 5-13). Another of Neely's witnesses, Dr. Eldon St. Joer receives
frequent referrals from Peterson, a "large percentage" of which are automobile accident
victims. (R. 299 at 158, lines 19-23). Peterson had a long-standing, friendly relationship
with DeBry and Associates, Neely's counsel.

For example, upon the conclusion of

Neely's first claim in September of 1993, Peterson sent a letter to counsel which
concluded, "We appreciate your cooperation in the handling of this account and hope to
continue our good relationship in the future." (R. 300 at 411-12, lines 17-3).
The parties knew going into the trial that an important issue would be
whether some or all of Neely's claimed injuries were from Neely's earlier accident. In
her opening statement, Neely's counsel acknowledged:

Interestingly, the two accidents were so tied together that one of her doctors described Neely in
1996 CT scan records as "a 24-year-old woman who hit her head in a motor vehicle accident on
10-22-92 and now has headaches, lightheadedness and blackouts." (R. 299 at 118-20, lines 1511.)
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What you should be aware of is, in 1992, Ranae Neely was involved in a
motor vehicle accident. Now, it's not the motor vehicle accident that we're here
about today. This was a motor vehicle accident some four years before the motor
vehicle accident that we're here to discuss today. But she does have a medical
past.
*

*

*

I think it's really important to keep those two things separate, because I
think the evidence will show that those injuries from c92 have resolved and new
injuries were caused by the 1996 accident.
(R. 299 at 75-76, lines 2-7, 12-15).
The jury was also alerted early on as to other key disputes it would have to resolve
in order to assess Neely's claimed injuries, including two specific questions: Did Neely
strike her head during the accident, and was she facing forward or to the side at the time
of the impact? If Neely did not strike her head, her own doctors' testimony indicated that
it was unlikely that she could have suffered concussion-related or TMJ injuries. If Neely
was facing forward at the time of the accident, she could not likely have suffered the jaw
injury she claimed.
Much of Dr. Reichert's treatment was based upon Neely's report to him that she
had struck her head. (R. 299 at 104, lines 1-15, 106, lines 1-22). Similarly, Neely's
physical therapist, Dallen Lovell, based his finding of a TMJ injury on Neely's claim that
she sustained a blow to the jaw because her head was turned to the right upon impact. (R.
300 at 363, lines 3-14, R. 300 at 358-59, lines 24-8, at 366-67 lines 4-8 (potential injury is
"much more severe" if head is turned than if head is facing forward)). Neely's oral
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surgeon, Dr. Blaine Austin, testified that the most important factor in his analysis was
Neely's report that she had hit her head and face. (R. 300 at 184, lines 13-23).
Because these two issues were determinative of Neely's claimed injuries, as well
as her credibility, Bennett's counsel exhorted the jury during his opening statement to pay
close attention on those points:
I'm going to ask you, as you listen to the evidence, to recall what she
reported to the emergency room physician: did not strike head or lose
consciousness. And this is an hour after the accident.
On the following day, May 17, 1996, she went to see chiropractor Peterson.
Chiropractor Peterson had treated Ms. Neely four years earlier in a rear-end motor
vehicle accident, and she, likewise, gave a description of the accident to him. And
I'm going to ask you to remember this that was reported to chiropractor Peterson
the day after the accident. "She was looking forward at the time of impact." . . .
(R. 299 at 93-94, lines 16-2).
The evidence indeed supported these assertions. At the St. Marks emergency room
approximately two hours after the accident, Neely stated that she "did not strike her
head". (R. 299 at 120, lines 12-19). Neely reported she had a "mild" headache. On
examination, Neely was found to be in only "slight distress" with tenderness in her neck
and upper back. (R. 261-62).
The next day, Neely told her chiropractor, Brad Peterson, that she was "looking
forward" at the time of the impact. She informed Peterson that her head was thrown
backward, striking the rear window of the truck. (R. 300 at 412-13, lines 12-9). Neely
did not mention any claimed blow to her jaw, and Peterson did not note any bumps or
bruising on Neely's face. (R. 300 at 414, lines 9-24).
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Six weeks later, however, Neely's story had evolved. Neely told Lovell that her
head was actually turned toward the right, because she was adjusting the truck radio. (R.
300 at 334, lines 9-11). Neely repeated that story to her psychologist, Gregory Mayer.
(R. 300 at 219, lines 13-22).
Over time, Neely's description of her accident gained in its dramatic presentation.
By the time Neely consulted Lovell six weeks after the accident, "she was rotated hard to
the right" in the accident, "recoiled forward, hit the end of her seatbelt, and then was
thrown back against the seat again," and "she had a lot of pain in the right side of her
head and face" which "felt like it was going to explode." (R. 300 at 334, lines 14-16, at
336, lines 1-3).
Neely told Dr. Mayer that she heard a "big . . . crash" that sounded "similar to
when trains are hooking up," that it took her a couple of minutes to figure out what had
happened, and that she "couldn't remember where [she] was." (R. 300 at 243, lines 2-7).
By now, Neely had "slammed" her head on the seat of her truck in the accident. (R. 300
at 273, lines 1-11). Neely told Dr. Reichert that the accident resulted in "significant
damage done to the truck." (R. 299 at 140, lines 18-21).
Testimony of various witnesses raised questions as to whether the symptoms
alleged by Neely existed, were exaggerated, or were attributable to the 1996 accident.
Some examples:
Headaches: Dr. Reichert testified that the headache symptoms described by Neely
-- including photophobia, pain from bright lights — are most typically associated with
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migraines, which are not routinely associated with motor vehicle accidents. (R. 299 at
121-22, lines 16-7).
Jaw pain / TMJ: The forces exerted on the temporomandibular joint in a 5-mileper-hour motor vehicle accident without a blow to the face are essentially equivalent to
the forces of chewing. (R. 301 at 597-98, lines 21-5).
Dr. St. Jeor testified that most TMJ injuries arise from causes other than
automobile accidents. (R. 299 at 158, lines 5-15). He further testified that posterior
capsulitis (inflammation and tenderness around the capsule around the jaw joint, in front
of the ear) can be caused by any type of trauma to the jaw, including "bruxing" (grinding
of teeth), which can occur while a patient sleeps. Myalgia can have the same cause. (R.
299 at 159-61, lines 4-24). St. Jeor admitted that he had not checked Neely for evidence
of bruxing, even though Neely had reported that she was clenching and grinding her teeth
at night. (R. 299 at 164-65, lines 19-9).
Dr. Austin testified that he had "mixed feelings" about whether a TMJ injury could
occur without a blow to the jaw. Two schools of thought have been articulated by
scholars in the American Journal of Oral Maxillofacial Surgeons, the standard journal
used in his profession, both of which appeared to Dr. Austin to be lacking in certain
aspects of their analyses. (R. 300 at 200, lines 10-20).
Dr. Austin acknowledged that studies have indicated that dislocation of the TMJ
meniscus can occur in the general population without a blow to the jaw. (R. 300 at 204,
lines 15-22).

Dr. St. Jeor similarly testified that dislocation occurs in the normal
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population without any history of a blow to the face or other direct trauma, and that it
manifests through a popping or clicking noise. (R. 299 at 160-61, lines 7-3). Transcranial
x-rays specific to Neely's jaw joint and a panarex of the joint and teeth all came back
normal. (R. 299 at 148, lines 4-24).
Dr. St. Jeor claimed that a force as mild as 1.6 miles per hour can cause damage to
the head, basing his conclusion on an article in the Cranial Journal. However, St. Jeor
admitted that he did not know how or when the studies were conducted, who conducted
them, or whether they involved real people or dummies, and that he "just read a — kind of
a brief abstract of the article." (R. 299 at 163, lines 8-19).3

Dr. Austin testified that

"there aren't any real good studies that indicate anything" about the degree of force
necessary to cause injury to the temporomandibular joint from a blow to the side of the
face. (R. 300 at 207, lines 3-10).
Neely had a genetic misalignment of her teeth that predated the accident. (R. 300
at 208-09, lines 17-25).

According to Dr. Austin, such a misalignment can cause

significant jaw and facial pain. (R. 300 at 210, lines 1-21). Dr. Dean Bawden, Neely's
uncle and an orthodontist, prescribed braces for her, and testified that he would have
expected muscle pain from the malocclusion alone. (R. 300 at 280, lines 2-11, at 283,

3

Dr. St. Jeor's testimony on this point is one example of Neely's failure to present the evidence
in the light most favorable to the verdict. In her brief, Neely omits St. Jeor's admissions that he
did not even read the article and that he knew nothing about its methodology or test subjects, and
states only the following: "On cross-examination Dr. St. Jeor testified that these findings were
published in The Cranial Journal. He could not recall the date or the authors of the article."
(Brief of Appellant at 18, t 59).
14

lines 18-25). Dr. Bawden characterized Neely' malocclusion as a significant condition
that "most likely" would have been causing jaw pain prior to the accident and, unless
corrected, would continue to cause pain. (R. 300 at 289, lines 2-20).
Neely's reported TMJ problem did not respond to treatment as would ordinarily be
expected. For example, Dr. St. Jeor testified that a splint will normally help even if a
TMJ patient has a dislocation, but that it did not seem to help Neely. (R. 299 at 153, lines
1-3). Similarly, Dr. Lovell testified that Neely's ability to open her mouth actually began
to regress, which was unusual. (R. 300 at 349, lines 16-25 ("Rarely, rarely do we have
problems where they start to go backwards")). Physical therapist Lovell testified that,
over the course of 17 treatments, Neely exhibited a "sawtooth" pattern of improvement,
followed by regression, resulting in no net improvement. (R. 300 at 351, lines 13-21).
Post-concussive symptoms, memory loss, and loss of cognitive function:
Dr. Reichert acknowledged that all objective tests to determine the existence of a
brain injury (MRI, CT, and EEG) came back normal. (R. 299 at 125-26, lines 16-5). Dr.
Reichert was unable to identify even a single study indicating that adults can suffer a
concussion without a physical blow to the head. (R. 299 at 143-44, lines 7-12).
At trial, Neely elicited testimony that a neuropsychological examination had
revealed problems with her attention and concentration, and had also indicated that her
overall intelligence level had decreased. (R. 300 at 231, lines 14-24). The results of the
neuropsychological exam did not dovetail with Neely's injuries, however. (R. 300 at 257,
lines 16-19). In particular, Dr. Mayer testified that the results of Neely's exam were not
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consistent with the type of accident that Neely was in. (R. 300 at 233, lines 6-8, at 234,
lines 11-21). According to Mayer, "the kind of accident she had should not generate test
results across the board that are so low as this. . . . You don't expect to see testing for
overall intelligence to lower, at least not very much." (R. 300 at 234-35, lines 13-15, 22i).
The doctor who conducted the neuropsychological examination concluded that
"this profile is suggestive of an individual who has multiple physical complaints that may
be more than would be expected." (R. 300 at 262, lines 4-8). The extent of Neely's
reported memory problems was also greater than expected: Dr. Reichert testified that the
length of Neely's memory problems was "unusual," inasmuch as most concussions get
better within the same period of time. (R. 299 at 142, lines 12-22).
Dr. Mayer testified that Neely was experiencing a psychological reaction, rather
than a post-concussive syndrome, and that he had no medical evidence indicating that
Neely had a brain injury. (R. 300 at 237, lines 7-15, at 244, lines 16-25). (R. 300 at 244,
lines 16-25). Additionally, Mayer believed that "an emotional component" was "coloring
the presentation and her experience of [Neely's] symptoms." (R. 300 at 222-23, lines 152). Several factors other than pain were affecting plaintiffs complaints, including lack of
sleep, anxiety, and depression. (R. 300 at 223, lines 3-20). Disruption of sleep, even for
a couple of hours, can affect memory significantly. (R. 300 at 237, lines 19-21).
Mayer testified that Neely had a tendency to "catastrophize" the accident, "to focus
on all kinds of little things that she's noticing would have been changed and to work over
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them and to get anxious over them, and to distract herself over them, and thereby increase
her anxiety, thereby increase her tendency to distract herself, thereby worsening her
performance, and thereby getting more anxious. And, thus, getting into a spiral that's
negative and downward and worsening." (R. 300 at 251, lines 5-17). Mayer testified that
the "great majority" of patients improve within a few weeks, and that, for those who do
not improve during that phase, nearly all resolve within sixth months to fifteen months.
(R. 300 at 225, lines 12-21).
According to Mayer, one warning sign of prevarication on a neuropsychological
exam is when the patient starts to miss easy questions: "For example, if a test is going to
get more difficult over items, the first items are easier and it gets subtly more difficult, the
patient that's being tested doesn't know to expect that. So if a patient starts missing easy
items, thinking, 'I've got to look bad,' that's a trip wire." (R. 300 at 268, lines 9-24). In
this case, Neely claimed to be unable to provide basic information about her husband
(such as his age), her own birthday, or the day of the week. (R. 300 at 254-55, lines 3-1;
R. 301 at 450, lines 10-11).
Stuttering: Dr. Webster testified that, in his 20 years' experience, he has never
seen an alleged whiplash victim develop a stutter. (R. 300 at 293, lines 18-20, at 297,
lines 1-9). Nancy Powell testified that Neely's form of stuttering was different from any
she had seen before. (R. 301 at 550-51, lines 12-7). After the stuttering problem emerged,
Dr. Reichert ordered an MRI, an MRA, and an EEG, all of which came back normal. (R.
299 at 130, lines 8-24). Reichert did not believe Neely's reported stuttering was caused

17

by a brain injury; rather, it was "functional".

(R. 299 at 130, lines 2-14)

Neely's

stuttering actually worsened during a course of treatment by Jepsen. (R. 300 at 375, lines
10-12).
In sum, the vast majority of Neely's complaints in this case were unsupported by
objective medical findings. Her primary complaint — pain — required the health care
providers to rely entirely upon the patient's subjective reports. (R. 300 at 320, lines 5-7)
Indeed, Dr. Webster stated that many doctors do not treat pain because of its dependence
upon such subjective criteria. (R. 300 at 329, lines 14-20).
Dr. Reichert admitted that his conclusions hinged upon the accuracy of
information received from Neely. As Reichert explained, "in terms of [the] patient's
medical workup, I mainly go on what the patient tells me their problems are, which is, if
they're having headaches or memory problems or whatever, they need to be checked out."
(R. 299 at 141, lines 22-5). Reichert acknowledged that those reports are not always
supported by objective findings. For example, Neely reported blurry vision in her right
eye, which looked normal upon objective observation. Neely also reported pain in her
right jaw area, which also appeared normal, with no bruising or other external sign of
injury. (R. 299 at 122, lines 8-16, at 124-25, lines 7-3.)
Neely's pain specialist, Dr. Lynn Webster, acknowledges that "secondary gain" is
"always a concern" with patients who complain of pain. (R. 300 at 321, lines 2-4).
"Secondary gain" refers to "the rewards and consequences that are potentially there, in
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addition to the more obvious consequences," which include money, sympathy from family
and friends, and not having to work. (R. 300 at 256, lines 1-12).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Neely failed to marshal all of the evidence in support of the verdict. This defect
took two forms: First, as demonstrated by a comparison of the parties' fact statements,
Neely omitted unfavorable information from her summary of evidence. Second, Neely
gives only an extended laundry list of record citations, making no effort to identify those
that support the verdict as opposed to Neely's own point of view. Neither this Court nor
the appellee should be required to sift through the citations to determine whose position is
supported by each one.
In any event, Neely also has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying her motion for a directed verdict. The existence of any evidence
that creates a material issue of fact requires an issue to be submitted to the jury. It is
difficult to envision a more individualized and fact intensive element requiring jury
consideration than damages in a personal injury case. In this case, ample evidence
existed from which the jury could have concluded that a significant portion of Neely's
injuries and medical expenses were of her own creation, or were not attributable to this
accident.
Finally, no basis has been provided for setting aside the jury's determination as to
the amount of damages Neely incurred. The jury was charged with the exclusive task of
evaluating the testimony presented, including that of expert witnesses. The jury was
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instructed that evidence from such witnesses could be counted or discounted as it saw fit.
The defendant had no duty to offer contrary expert testimony; rather, he was free to
explore the weaknesses in Neely's case through cross-examination of Neely's own
witnesses. The credibility of those witnesses, all of whom based their conclusions on
information supplied by Neely, turned on the credibility of Neely herself, which suffered
by virtue of her varying and increasingly exaggerated accounts. Moreover, the jury could
have concluded that many of Neely's injuries were attributable to the 1992 accident, for
which Bennett was not responsible.
ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL ALL OF THE
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE JURY'S VERDICT.

It is well established that an appellant who challenges the sufficiency of evidence
to sustain a jury verdict is required to marshal all of the evidence in the record that would
support the verdict, and appellant gained permission from this Court to file a 91-page
brief in order to fulfill that obligation. Instead of reciting the evidence in support of the
verdict, however, Neely's brief consists of a 284-paragraph summary of testimony, most
of which is offered in support of Neely's position, and none of which is segregated or
specified as favorable to the defendant.
This Court has indicated that such a blanket recitation does not fulfill a party's
marshalling obligation. In Heinecke v. Dept. of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 464 (Utah
App. 1991), the Court wrote:
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While many appellants completely overlook or disregard this heavy burden,
Heinecke did not disregard the obligation entirely, but he did misperceive it.
Instead of marshalling only the evidence supporting the Division's findings,
Heinecke reviewed in minute detail all the evidence before the Nursing Board.
Moreover, Heinecke insisted on emphasizing the evidence that supported his
position, and left it to the court to sort out what evidence actually supported the
findings. Like the appellant in Horton v. Gem State Mut. Of Utah, 794 P.2d 847
(Utah Ct. App. 1990), Heinecke failed to completely satisfy his obligation to
marshal the evidence by "consistently arguing [his] own position without regard
for the evidence supporting the [Division's] findings." Id. at 849.
(Original brackets and emphasis).
Neely's statement of facts reflects nothing more than a desire to have this Court reweigh the evidence. In Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 839 (Utah 1992), an
unhappy defendant made the same attempt, which was rejected by the Utah Supreme
Court:
Although the Bank made an admirable listing of evidence presented in the case
upon which the verdict could have been based, the Bank's arguments merely refute
the credibility of this evidence and of Heslop as a witness. The Bank does not
base its argument upon the insufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict.
Instead it relies on other, contradictory evidence that supports the bank's position.
Additionally, as demonstrated by the above statement of facts, Neely omitted
testimony that was supportive of the verdict. For example, Neely does not mention at all
the testimony of her physical therapist, Dallen Lovell, which revealed various
inconsistences in Neely's account of the accident. Neely also fails to mention her own
contradictory account of the events. By omitting unfavorable information, Neely has not
met her obligation of folly and accurately disclosing all evidence that could support the
verdict. This Court has "shown no reluctance to affirm the jury's verdict when a party
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fails to meet its marshaling burden," Dejavue, Inc. v. U. S. Energy Corp., 993 P.2d 222,
226 (Utah App. 1999), and that result is compelled here.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED NEELY'S MOTION
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT ON CAUSATION AND SPECIAL
DAMAGES,

"Under Utah law, a party who moves for a directed verdict has the very difficult
burden of showing no evidence exists that raises a question of material fact." Alta Health
Strategies, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical Service, 930 P.2d 280, 284 (Utah App. 1996) (original
emphasis). If there is any evidence that raises a question of material fact, the motion is
properly denied. Id. This Court will overturn the denial of a motion for directed verdict
only if, upon a review of all evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, reasonable
minds could not disagree with the ground asserted for directing a verdict. Beard v. KMart 406 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2000 UT App 285 f 5.
In DeBry v. Cascade Enterprises, 879 P.2d 1353 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme
Court observed that, when a plaintiff claims on appeal that she is entitled to a certain
damage award as a matter of law, her burden is twofold:
Here, the plaintiffs seek a judgment notwithstanding the verdict for
affirmative relief against the defendants on the ground that the plaintiffs are
entitled to all the damages they seek as a matter of law. For the court to rule that
the DeBrys were entitled to a judgment n.o.v. in the amount of all the damages
they claim, the DeBrys must not only marshall all evidence that supports the
verdict; they must also demonstrate that reasonable persons could not have
concluded as the jury did and that they were entitled to the full amount of the
damages claimed as a matter of law and not just damages in some amount.
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Id. at 1359 (affirming denial of motion for directed verdict on damages and motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict) (original italics; underlining added).
In this case, Neely's motion for directed verdict asked the trial court to rule as a
matter of law that all of Neely's alleged injuries resulted from the 1996 car accident, that
all of her medical treatment was reasonable and necessary, and that she was entitled to
every penny of the special damages she was claiming. Neely's sole argument, then and
now, is that Bennett "did not present any medical evidence to support his contention that
the petitioner's injuries were not caused by the crash at issue[.]" (Brief of Appellant at 1).
This argument has two main flaws: First, it is not a defendant's burden of proof to
prove what injuries were not caused by an accident; it is the plaintiffs burden to prove
what injuries were caused by the accident. Second, Bennett presented ample evidence to
rebut the testimony of Neely's witnesses, through extensive cross-examination of those
witnesses and through direct examination of his own witnesses.
With respect to the first point, Neely takes the rather novel position that a
defendant has a duty to disprove causation with an expert if the plaintiff has an expert.
This contention turns the burden of proof on its head.

A defendant has no such

affirmative duty; the defendant's only job to is raise sufficient uncertainty in the jury's
mind about the plaintiffs evidence. Theoretically, a defendant would be free to rise at
the end of a four-day of trial, declare, "I don't think she was that badly hurt," and sit
down again. If the jury agrees, that is its prerogative.

23

There is no authority for Neely's position under Utah law. The only support
offered is a quotation that has been altered so as to change its meaning
This court has held that:
Where the injury involves obscure medical factors which are beyond the
ordinary lay persons' knowledge, necessitating speculation in making a finding,
there must be expert testimony that the negligent act [did not] caused the
injury.
(Brief of Appellant at 80, citing Beard, supra, ^f 16) (appellant's brackets and emphasis).
Beard, of course, says no such thing. In that case, this Court was discussing a
plaintiffs burden of proof. There is a stark difference between a plaintiffs burden and
that of a defendant, and Neely cannot erase the distinction simply by inserting the words
"did not" into a quotation.
The jury, as instructed, was free to disregard as much of the testimony of Neely's
witnesses as it deemed appropriate. (The jury obviously did not disregard all of Neely's
evidence, as it awarded her sums for both special and general damages. Had the jury
awarded $0 across the board, different issues would be raised.). See also DeBry, 879
P.2d at 1360 (rejecting claim that jury was required to accept uncontroverted expert
testimony as to damages; "The determinative point is that the jury was not bound under
the law to accept the plaintiffs' evidence and award the full amount of damages sought, or
even to view that evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs5 case.")
In arguing to the contrary, Neely repeatedly proclaims that Bennett "did not call
any expert witnesses," and that her evidence was therefore uncontroverted. That assertion
completely ignores the testimony of Bennett's accident reconstmctionist regarding
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collision forces, and Bennett's extensive cross-examination of Neely's witnesses. For
example, Bennett's examination of Dr. Reichert covered 22 !4 pages of trial transcript,
compared to 23 lA pages for Neely's direct. Bennett's cross-examination of Dr. St. Jeor
extended for 8 pages of transcript, compared to 13 Vi pages for Neely's direct. Bennett
cross-examined Dr. Mayer over 22 pages of transcript, and Neely 39.

Bennett's

examination of Dr. Austin extended to 15 pages of transcript, Neely's to 19.
A party is entitled to elicit testimony from his opponent's witnesses. Indeed, the
jury in this case was expressly instructed that "the evidence in the case will consist of the
sworn testimony of the witnesses, regardless of who may have called them . . . ." (R. 95;
emphasis added).

See also DeBry, 879 P.2d at 1360 ("in some instances, cross-

examination of the Debrys' witnesses demonstrated the arguable nature of their claim").
Although the witnesses offered testimony supportive of Neely's claims, the jury
was entitled, if not required, to examine the underpinnings of that testimony. Nearly all
of the expert's conclusions in this case hinged on subjective reports by Neely. There was
plenty of evidence from which the jury could have doubted Neely's credibility, whether
from observing her on the stand, or doubting her inconsistent and exaggerated accounts of
the accident, or wondering why her medical conditions were so "unusual" even to her
own doctors, or considering the secondary gain she might receive. If the jury lacked
confidence in Neely herself, it would necessarily lack confidence in expert testimony that
relied almost entirely upon information provided by Neely.

See, ej*., Thompson v.

LeGrand Johnson Construction Co., 688 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah 1984) (jury was not
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required to accept incontroverted expert testimony that back injury was caused by
accident; additionally, expert opinion was based upon history related by plaintiff).
The trial court correctly recognized that there was evidence from which the jury
could discount some or all of Neely's claims, and Neely's motion for directed verdict was
properly denied.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING NEELY'S MOTION FOR ADDITUR OR FOR NEW
TRIAL.

Neely's motion for additur or for new trial was defective for reasons similar to
those discussed above. The denial of Neely's motion will be overturned only if the trial
court abused its discretion and, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party, the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Crookston v. Fire Ins.
ExchL, 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991).
Evidence in support of the verdict has been summarized above, with citations to
the record. In Point B of her Brief, however, Neely insists that her expert testimony was
'^incontroverted," and that it "established" her entitlement to roughly $87,000 in special
damages, plus a commensurately enlarged general damages award. Once again, Neely
completely disregards the evidence elicited from her witnesses on cross-examination, and
the testimony of Bennett's accident reconstructionist regarding the mild forces to which
Neely would have been subjected by the collision.
This accident was, by all accounts, a low speed (five miles per hour) rear-end
collision — hardly a "crash," as repeatedly characterized in Neely's brief— with minimal
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damage to either vehicle. On at least two occasions that day and the next, Neely reported
little or no discomfort from the accident: She told the emergency room physician that she
had not struck her head, and the physician noted only "mild" distress. She mentioned
nothing about a great crash or her head feeling like it would "explode." The day after the
accident, she told her supervisor that she had been in a "minor" accident, and that she was
okay, not mentioning the agony that she later claimed to have been experiencing at the
time.
The jury could have chosen to believe Neely's initial indications that she did not
hit her head or her jaw, which meant that Neely's alleged TMJ and other painful
conditions (if legitimate) were caused by something other than the accident. The jury
could have found significant the absence of any harm to the occupants of the less-sturdy
Escort, including small children. The jury could have had difficulty reconciling Neely's
stirring account of a "big crash" that sounded like two trains coming together with repair
bills of $50 and $150. The jury could have wondered why Neely was not wearing her
neck brace when Powell happened to drive by her house a few weeks after the accident.
In other words, the jury could have believed from the evidence presented that
Neely was a little stiff and sore for a while after a minor, run-of-the-mill traffic accident,
and that she did not suffered any other injuries. Such a finding would be fully consistent
with the scope of special and general damages awarded.
The jurors were instructed that "it was their exclusive duty to determine the facts
in this case, and to consider and weigh the evidence for that purpose." (Jury Instruction
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No. 2, R. 93). The jury was further instructed that in its consideration of the evidence, it
was not limited to the bald statements of witnesses, but rather: "You are permitted to
draw, from the facts which you find have been provided, such reasonable inferences as
you feel are justified in light of your experience." (R. 96). With respect to the testimony
of expert witnesses, the jury was instructed:
The rules of evidence ordinarily do no permit the opinion of a witness to be
received as evidence. An exception to this rule exists in the case of expert
witnesses. Witnesses who, by education, study and experience, have
become expert in some art, science, profession or calling, may state
opinions as to any such matter in which that witness is qualified as an
expert, so long as it is material and relevant to the case. You should
consider such expert opinion and the reasons, if any, given for it. You are
not bound by such an opinion. Give it the weight you think it deserves. If
you should decide that the opinions of an expert witness are not based upon
sufficient education and experience, or if you should conclude that the
reasons given in support of the opinions are not sound, or that such opinions
are outweighed by other evidence, you may disregard the opinion entirely.
(Jury Instruction No. 11, R. 103, requested by Neely, R. 170) (emphasis added).
The jury was instructed as to Neely's burden of proof, as explained by the trial
court:
The term "preponderance of the evidence" means that evidence which, in
your minds, seems to be of the greater weight; the most convincing and
satisfactory. The preponderance of the evidence is not determined by the
number of witnesses, nor the amount of the testimony, but the convincing
character of the testimony, weighted impartially, fairly and honestly by you,
the jury. If the evidence is evenly balanced as to its convincing force on
any allegation, you must find that such allegation has not been proved.
(Jury Instruction No. 14, R. 106; emphasis added).
Even if the jury was persuaded as to the legitimacy of Neely's claimed injuries, it
could have concluded that some or all of them were not attributable to this accident. The
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jury was instructed that liability could not be imposed upon Bennett for pre-existing
injuries, and that the jury should apportion such injuries if possible. (Jury Instruction No.
34, R. 125 ("A person who has a condition or disability at the time of any injury is not
entitled to recover damages for that condition or disability"); Jury Instruction No. 36, R.
127). There was evidence in this case that Neely had experienced numerous health
problems prior to the accident, including headaches, memory loss, and depression.
Neely5 s own witnesses confirmed that a number of her complaints after the 1996 accident
duplicated complaints made after the 1992 accident.
Neely bore the burden of proof on both causation and damages. It is obvious from
the jury's award that, while it believed Neely suffered some injury in the accident, it also
concluded the injuries were not as extensive or as severe as Neely claimed.

Such

determination is clearly the function and duty of the jury, and the trial court properly
declined to substitute its own judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, appellee respectfully requests the Court to affirm the
judgment of the district court.
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